is an interactive theorem prover that supports a variety of logics. It represents rules as propositions (not as functions) and builds proofs by combining rules. These operations constitute a metahlogic (or 'logical framework') in which the object-logics are formalized. Isabelle is now based on higher-order logic -a precise and well-understood foundation.
History and Overview
The dominance of classical first-order logic is challenged every year by something new. Scott's Logic of Computable Functions appeared in 1969 and attracted the interest of Robin Milner. Milner built a proof checker but found it impossibly tedious for proofs of any length. He later developed Edinburgh LCF, a proof checker that was programmable [26] .
Edinburgh LCF's meta-language (ML) does not merely execute obvious command sequences. ML gives a general representation of logic. Terms and formulae are computable data, as are theorems. Each inference rule is a function from theorems to theorems. A theorem can be built only by applying rules to existing theorems.
While forwards proof is fundamental, it is often preferable to work backwards from a goal. Each inference rule maps premises to a conclusion; its 'inverse' is a function (called a tactic) mapping a goal to subgoals. A tactic also returns a validation: a function from theorems to a theorem. When the backwards proof is finished, applying the validation functions performs the forwards proof, and yields the desired theorem. Tacticals operate on tactics, expressing control structures such as sequential or repetitive application of a tactic.
ML's secure type checking ensures soundness: theorems are constructed only by rules. Exceptions signal when a rule or tactic is wrongly applied. Still, a tactic can be invalid: promising more than it can deliver. If its validation function is wrong then the final forwards proof will not yield the theorem that was expected. Tactics should be built using tactics and tacticals known to be valid. The LCF environment grows with use: rules can be composed as functions: tactics can be combined by tacticals. By 1986, Edinburgh LCF's techniques had spread to several systems [29] , Standard ML had become a language in its own right, and Isabelle reached a usable form. Isabelle was intended to allow LCF-style proofs in various logics, using a representation of logic that did not require writing a function for each rule. In Isabelle-86, a rule was represented by a Horn clause; rules could be combined to build proofs [28] . (See also de Groote [14] .) Since forwards and backwards proof were simply styles of proof construction, there was little difference between rules and tactics. Each state of a backwards proof was a derived rule:
subgoal. . . subgoal original goal
Isabelle's tactics and tacticals could be used like LCF ones, though they were based on totally different principles.
The initial concern was with implementation problems. Quantifiers required a syntax involving the typed 2-calculus, while the joining of rules required unification; these together required higher-order unification [19] . I experimented with many different ways of enforcing the variable conditions of quantifier rules. Eventually Isabelle-86 supported many logics: Martin-L6f's Type Theory, intuitionistic and classical sequent calculi, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. It was implemented in Standard ML.
Isabelle-86 was based on naive calculus of rules. It left many questions open, such as whether the following rules should be regarded as distinct:
The treatment of quantifiers seemed particularly unclear. Many people have developed calculi for mathematical reasoning [7, 9, 15, 25] . A calculus of logics is often called a logical framework; I prefer to speak of a meta-logic and its object-logics. Isabelle-86 required a precise meta-logic suited to its aims and methods. A fragment of higher-order logic (called J/g here for 'meta') now serves this purpose. Implication expresses entailment; universal quantification expresses schematic rules and general premises; equality expresses definitions. The meta-logic extends that of Isabelle-86: it can express things like 'adding the double negation rule to intuitionistic logic entails the excluded middle. ' Isabelle constructs proofs through deductions in J/'. The paper presents these methods formally in order to clarify theoretical issues such as soundness. Here is an outline of the paper: Section 2 presents the meta-logic J¢/: intuitionistic higher-order logic. Section 3 formalizes the natural deduction rules for intuitionistic propositional logic in ~1. The formalization is shown to be sound and complete by induction on normalized proofs.
The terms are those of the typed 2-calculus -constants, variables, abstractions, combinations -with the usual type constraints. Let a, b, and c stand for terms, using f, g, and h for terms of function type. Typical bound variables will be x, y, and z. Write a:a to mean 'a has type a. ' The basic types and constants depend on the logic being represented. But they always include the type of propositions, prop, and the logical constants of ~. A formula is a term of type prop. Let ~b, ~b, and 0 stand for formulae. The implication q~ ~ ~b means '~b implies 6.' The universally quantified formula A x. q~ means 'for all x, q~ is true,' where x ranges over some type a. The equality a = b means 'a equals b. ' The symbols ~, A, and = have been chosen to differ from symbols of objectlogics: those to be represented in J/g. In an object-logic presented below the corresponding symbols are =, V, and =. The words 'meta-implication,' 'meta-equality,' 'meta-formula,' 'meta-theorem,' 'meta-rule,' etc., refer to expressions of J/g. Quantification involves A-abstraction. For every type a, there is a constant A o of type (a --* prop) --* prop. The formula A x. ~b, where x has type a, abbreviates to A~(Ax. ~b). Using A-conversions every quantification can be rendered in the form A ~(f), more readably A x .f(x), wherefis a term of type a ~ prop. Abstraction also expresses quantifiers in object-logics, as we shall see in Section 5.
SYNTACTIC CONVENTIONS
The application of a to the successive arguments b~ .... , b m is written a(b~, . . ., b,,): a(bl, . . . , b,,) abbreviates (" " " (abl) " " " bm)
In the absence of parentheses, implication (~) groups to the right. Let The scope of a 2 or quantifier extends far to the right:
A substitution has the form [a~/x~ .... , ak/xk], where Xl, . . ., xk are distinct variables and aj, . . . , ak are terms. If b is an expression and s is the substitution above then bs is the expression that results from simultaneously replacing every free occurrence of xi by ai in b, for i = 1,... , k (of course ai must have the same type as xi). Substitution must be carefully defined to avoid capture of free variables.
Substitutions are not part of .~¢'g itself. The term f(a) indicates function application, not substitution. The/?-reduction law, namely ((2x. b)(a)) -b[a/x], expresses substitution at the object-level.
SEMANTICS OF THE META-LOG1C
Higher-order logic is a language for writing formal mathematics. It can be justified on intuitive grounds, or else we can demonstrate its consistency by constructing a standard model in set theory.
Every type denotes a non-empty set. Given sets for each basic type, the interpretation of a --, ~ is the set of functions from a to ~. A closed term of type a denotes a value of the corresponding set. Given a value for each constant, 2-abstractions denote functions.
The typeprop denotes a set of truth values. Classical logic uses {T, F}; topos theory provides various intuitionistic interpretations [22] . The logical constants (A~, ~, and =-~) denote appropriate truth-valued functions.
REMARK. Requiring all types to be non-empty permits this simple inference system, where (Ax. A0.0) ~ (A 0.0) is a theorem. (Here 0 is a bound variable of type prop!) If the type of x were empty then A 0.0 would be true; every formula would be true; the logic would be inconsistent.
Lambek and Scott ( [22] pp. 128-132) present an inference system for higher-order logic allowing empty types.
INFERENCE RULES
The constant symbols include, for every type or,
The implication rules are ~-introduction and ~-elimination:
These are natural deduction rules; ~-introduction discharges the assumption 4~. In most other rules, the conclusion depends on all assumptions of the premises.
The universal quantification rules are A-introduction and A-elimination:
These are also called generalization and specialization. The generalization rule is subject to the eigenvariable condition that x is not free in the assumptions. The equality rules are reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity:
The 2-conversions are e-conversion (bound variable rnaming),/~-conversion, and extensionality:
The e-conversion axiom holds provided y is not free in a. Extensionality holds provided x is not free in the assumptions, f, or g. Extensionality is equivalent to q-conversion, namely (2x .f(x)) -fwhere x is not free inf(see Hindley and Seldin [16] pp. 72-74).
The abstraction and combination rules are a=_b f=ga=_b
Abstraction holds provided x is not free in the assumptions. Logical equivalence means equality of truth values: The typed 2-calculus satisfies the strong normalization and Church-Rosser properties [16] . Thus repeatedly applying/~ and q-reductions always terminates. The reductions can take place in any order; the resulting normal form will be the same up to e-conversion. To summarize: THEOREM 1. Every term can be reduced to a normal form that is unique up to e-conversion.
REMARK. Because of normal forms, equality is decidable in the typed )r-calculusbut not in higher-order logic. The normal form does not take account of the logical rules. No effective procedure can reduce every theorem to some unique true formula.
There is also a normalization procedure for HOL proofs. This plays a crucial role in demonstrating that an object-logic is faithfully expressed.
Representing lntuitionistic Propositional Logic
To represent an object-logic in Isabelle we extend the recta-logic with types, constants, and axioms. A simple example is intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL).
To represent the syntax of IPL, introduce the basic type form for denotations of formulae. Introduce the constant symbols Object-sentences are enclosed in double brackets ~ ~. The meta-formula [[A~ abbreviates true(A) and means that A is true. Keeping the typesJbrm and prop distinct avoids presuming that truth-values of the object-logic are identical to those of the meta-logic. To avoid confusing these logics, let us use distinctive terminology. There is a recta-rule called ~-elimination. The similar object-rule is called the = E rule, while the corresponding recta-axiom is called the ~ E axiom.
The natural deduction rules ( Figure 1 ) of intuitionistic logic are represented by recta-level axioms ( Figure 2 ). The resulting extension of d//is called ogWL. The outer quantifiers of meta-axioms will often be dropped.
The new symbols have the usual interpretations. Let the typeforrn denote a set of truth values such that &, v, ~, and L have their intuitionistic meanings ( [11] Chapter 5). The axioms are true under this semantics: for example, if A is true and B is true then A & B is true. Meta-implication (~) expresses the discharge of assumptions. The ~ I axiom says that if the truth of A implies the truth of B, then the formula A ~ B is true.
The resemblance between the recta-level axioms and the rules should be regarded as a happy coincidence. An axiom formalizes not the syntax of a rule but its semantic justification. The resemblance diminishes in first-order logic (Section 5). The formalization of modal logic by Avron et al. [3] (in their recta-logic) reflects Kripke semantics rather than the syntax of the rules.
An obvious question is whether the object-logic is faithfully represented. The definition below is oriented towards natural deduction: it concerns entailments rather than theorems. Informally, d[~pL is sound for IPL because the additional axioms are true and the rules of Jd are sound. A better argument is by induction on normal proofs in ~[. Here is a summary of the proof-theoretic concepts of Prawitz [31, 32] . For simplicity, let us ignore equality rules, identifying terms that are equivalent up to 2-conversions.
A branch in a proof traces the construction and destruction of a formula. Each branch is obtained by repeatedly walking downwards from a premise of a rule to its conclusion, but terminates at the second premise of ~-elimination. Thus in a branch may connect ~b ~ • with 0 but not q5 with 0 since these formulae may be syntactically unrelated. (This discussion is for Jd/. For logics having other connectives, most elimination rules are special cases.)
Every proof in J{ can be normalized such that, in every branch, no elimination rule immediately follows an introduction rule. In a normal proof, every branch begins with an assumption or axiom, then has a series of eliminations, then a series of introductions. During the eliminations the formulae shrink to a minimum; during the introductions they grow again.
Observe that ~B~ is an atomic J/~pwformula. A normal proof can be put into expanded normal form, where every minimum formula is atomic ([32] p. 254). For example, if a minimum formula is ~b ~ ~, then the following can be spliced into the proof, reducing the minimum formula to ~,:
Completeness holds because to each object-level inference there corresponds a meta-proof involving an o~/~ec axiom. Soundness holds because to each occurrence of an o'#we axiom in a meta-proof there corresponds an object-level inference. Since ~B~ is atomic, the branch terminating with ~B~ cannot contain introduction rules, and thus cannot discharge assumptions. The branch must consist entirely of elimination rules. If it is just [B~ then B is an assumption, one of A~ ..... Am. A AB.
IB[) IA D B 1
[Icll ICI => IDI
Ic :, Df
The meta-proof formalizing an ~ I inference.
Otherwise the branch contains elimination rules, so its first formula cannot be atomic. It must consist of an axiom followed by elimination rules. There is one case for each axiom.
For the &I axiom, B is C & D for some formulae C and D. The recta-proof must have the structure of Figure 3 . It has two A -eliminations involving C and D, and two =*-eliminations, involving proofs of ~C]~ and ~D~ from ~AI~ .... , ~Am~. By the induction hypothesis, construct IPL proofs of C and D from A~ .... ,A m. Applying &! gives an IPL proof of C & D.
For the D I axiom, B is C ~ D. The meta-proof must have the structure of Then the rule is applied to an IPL proof of D from A1 ..... Am, C. By the induction hypothesis, construct an J/wL-proof of ~D~ from ~Al~ .... , ~A,,,~, ~(C~. Now it is easy to construct a meta-proof like that in Figure 4 .
The cases for the other axioms are similar.
[] REMARK. The heavy use of meta-implication (~) may suggest that the meta-logic ought to involve sequents. Then the &I axiom would be ~A~, ~B~ k ~A & B~ and the resolution rule (Section 4.2) would resemble the cut rule. However, this amounts to using the sequent symbol as a logical connective. In typical usage, an axiom is a formula -not a sequent [36] . Such a use of sequents would also complicate the use of hypothetical rules (illustrated in Section 4.4).
Backwards Proof Construction
The reduction of the goal ~b to the subgoals ~bt ..... qS,,, amounts to deriving the rule ~1,..., ~,,/~. The meta-logic represents this object-level rule as the implication [qS~, . . . , qS,,] ~ 4). Such Horn clauses are combined by a derived meta-rule: resolution. Let us begin by looking at backwards proof as a style of proof construction. Then we can formalize backwards proof in J~, obtaining the methods implemented in Isabelle.
PROOF STATES AS DERIVED RULES
In this section, 'rule,' 'proof,' etc., refer to object-level rules and proofs. The method is illustrated by a sample proof in intuitionistic propositional logic:
A&C C~A&C A &B ~ (C ~ A &C)
A backwards proof grows from the root upwards, rather than from the leaves downwards. Every state of the proof can be represented by a derived rule whose conclusion is the main goal, here A & B ~ (C ~ A & C), and whose premises are the current subgoals. The proof of the derived rule -namely, the internal structure has no further role and is suppressed. The initial state is represented by the trivial rule whose premise and conclusion are identical. Figure 5 shows the sequence of proof states, represented as derived rules. Each step is written as an arrow (like @) giving the inference rule and step number. The initial rule is combined with ~ I, to derive a rule involving the discharge of the assumption A & B. Combining this rule again with ~ I adds C to the assumptions. Combining the resulting rule with &I derives a rule that has two premises. This splits the goal A & C in two. The full proof at this point is
The second subgoal, C, holds trivially by assumption. The first subgoal is proved using &E to prove A from A & B. The final state is the theorem A & B ~ (C D A&C).
PROOF CONSTRUCTION BY RESOLUTION
To formalize this kind of proof construction in//g requires a change in notation. An object-inference like Tx a 8 will now be written ~A & B} => ~A]. The meta-inference q5 ~-~ 0 will now be written ~ The initial state in a proof of C is formalized by the trivial meta-theorem ~C~ ~ ~C~. A state of the proof having n subgoals is represented by a derived object-rule having n premises, formalized by the meta-theorem
The state with zero subgoals is the meta-theorem ~C~, which represents the objecttheorem C. Outer quantifiers are dropped, so the meta-theorems may contain free variables.
Most Isabelle proof steps use resolution, a derived meta-rule. Resolution instantiates free variables of an object-rule by unification against a subgoal in the proof state. In a simple case, the substitution s must match ~b against ~, namely ~bs = ~b:
S v ~ Os ~ 0 (1)
The list notation for nested implication eliminates subscripts; @ and ~v are lists of formulae. Here is the meta-rule again, writing out the lists in full. Let i be given; if q~s = ~i then REMARK. Isabelle resolution [28] is ordinary resolution restricted to Horn clauses. Many Isabelle proof procedures use techniques of logic programming. Completeness of resolution is not a central issue in Isabelle, for a proof may use any meta-rules.
LIFTING A RULE OVER ASSUMPTIONS
The resolution rule (1) represents LCF-style backwards proof, which does not recognize natural deduction. In LCF (and early versions of Isabelle) natural deduction must be expressed through a sequent calculus. Our formalization of IPL expresses natural deduction by meta-implication. We now supplement resolution with a method (called If ~ represents an object-rule then it must be an implication, say ~b ~ ~'. To push 0 to the right, assume 0 ~ ~b and apply the following meta-rule, whose derivation is simple:
If qJ' is also an implication then repeating this step pushes 0 fully to the right; finally, an equal number of ~-introductions discharges the assumptions like 0 ~ 4~. If ~' is not an implication then the result would be
Now if ® = [0t .... , Ok] then repeatedly apply the process above to Ok ..... 01. 
A Sample Proof
To save space, define abbreviations for the main goal and the assumption list:
The next step is resolution with the &I axiom, after lifting it over the assumptions:
The [13] prefers higher-order logic because it can express many of its derived rules as theorems. Isabelle expresses derived rules as meta-theorems, allowing us to work in first-order logic or even weaker systems.
I. A New Conjunction Rule
The &E rules typically work in the forwards direction: from A & B conclude A. Another version of conjunction elimination, resembling v E, is better suited to backwards proof:
This conjunction rule discharges the assumptions A and B in its second premise: we can also say [33] that its second premise is the rule Ace. The formalization in J/4"WL is Here the premise is a schematic rule. We must make, and finally discharge, the quantified meta-assumption 
Quantification
Many logical constants introduce bound variables: universal and existential quantifiers (V and ~), description operators (2, t and e), general product and sum (II and Y,), union and intersection of families (as in U:~: As), and so on. Isabelle implements logics comprising most of these. Adding quantifiers to the previous object-logic gives intuitionistic first-order logic The rules ( Figure 6) and their recta-level axioms (Figure 7) do not have the clos, resemblance that we saw for propositional logic. The eigenvariable conditions of V and ~E are not formalized literally. Note that the two conditions differ in form bu not in effect. Both ensure that x serves only to specify a truth-valued function, througl its occurrences in A.
In the axioms, F denotes not the text of the quantification but its meaning: truth-valued function. The axiom YI states that if F is an everywhere-true functio then Yx. F(x) is true. Similary, B denotes not the text of a formula but a truth-valm The 3E axiom states that if3x. particular, B may not be replaced by a formula containing x. Assumptions also obey the eigenvariable conditions, as we shall see below.
The demonstration that these axioms faithfully represent first-order logic is similar to that for propositional logic (Section 3). The hardest case is when the last inference is 3E. Then the rule is applied to an IFOL proof of 3x. A, and to a proof of B from A. By the axiom for ~E, it is enough to prove the theorems ~3x. A~ and A x. ~A~ ~ IBm. By the induction hypothesis, there is an Jg'WoL-proof of ~3X. A~, and also a proof of ~B~ from ~A ~. The meta-proof resembles that in Figure 9 , where G is 2x. A. Again, terms having the same normal form are identified.
[] REMARK. Perhaps the type names term and form are overly syntactic; term denotes a set of individuals while.form denotes a set of truth-values. The meaning of A ~ B should depend on the meanings of A and B, not on their syntactic structure. Still, types play an important syntactic role. An expression of type term represents an IFOL term, and similarly.form represents formulae. By assigning a type to each syntactic category of the object-logic, type-checking in Jg enforces syntactic constraints.
Backwards Proof with Quantifiers
Quantifiers complicate backwards proof: goals may contain unknowns and parameters. An unknown takes the form of a free variable in the proof state, and can be replaced by any term. Unification is a standard technique for solving unknowns. A parameter comes from an eigenvariable of a rule. Parameters have two possible representations, A-bound variables and Hilbert e-terms. 
Why is this a theorem? By the v I axiom, ~G(z)~ implies ~G(z) v H(z)] for all G, H, and z. Thus we may reduce A z. ~G(z) v H(z)] to the subgoal A z. ~G(z)].
The 3I axiom has quantified variables F and y:
A Fy. IF(y)] ~ [3x. F(x)~
Lifting over z produces quantified variables G and f:
A By the reduce clearer if we recall that 3x. F(x) means 3(F) and 3x. G(z, x) means 3(G(z)); we have replaced F by G(z). If the object-rule has several premises then ~' will also be an implication; continue pushing the A z into the right. Then use ~-introduction to discharge the assumptions like A z. ~b, and use A -introduction to generalize over the variablesfl, . .... fk. This yields general forms of lifting.
Repeated lifting over the variables z,,,..., zl allows resolution with the goal A21 • -• z,,.0.
A Sample Proof
Consider a proof of Vz. G(z) v H(z) from Vz. G(z): 
Here resolution must cope with function variables like F~, determining the correct )o-abstaction and identifying terms that have the same nrmal form. For this Isabelle uses higher-order unification [19, 28] . The conclusion is normalized to eliminate /%redexes.
Observe that the goal G(z) v H(z) must be proved for arbitrary z, a parameter.
The next step uses the v I axiom, which becomes the meta-theorem (4) 
The final resolution replaces f3 by 2z. z, and so
G(f3(z)) -G((2z.z)(z)) =-G(z)
This use of function variables is typical: the termf3(z) states precisely its dependence on the context. The following sections give more examples.
3 When this example was run, Isabelle did actually make the correct unifier its first choice. The variable G2 is instantiated to 2xy. x = y, so the normal form of G2( x, fz(x) ) is
A Successful Proof
Putting )~x.x for f2 solves the subgoal, A x. {Ix = fz(X)~, by reflexivity. In the formal proof, this happens by lifting the reflexivity axiom over x and then resolving:
Consider the steps of higher-order unification [19, 28] . The initial disagreement pair is reduces to the pairs ().x. g3(x), 2X. X) and ().x. g3 (X),)~X. Yl )-The first pair forces g3(x) to be 2x. x, reducing the second to (2x. x, 2x.y~ ) , which has no unifier.
Other Representations of Eigenvariables
We have seen how to express most forms of Isabelle-86 proof construction as formal inference in a meta-logic. What about the Isabelle-86 treatment of eigenvariables? lsabelle-86 does not use A -lifting; it enforces eigenvariable conditions literally. The quantifier rule
holds provided y is not free in V or A. (Isabelle-86 cannot handle natural deduction, so its object-logics are typically sequent calculi.) Isabelle-86 reduces F • Vx. A(x) to the subgoal F ~-A(y), where y is a variable not previously used in the proof. Since two proofs must not be combined if they have eigenvariables in common, resolution renames all eigenvariables in its first premise. Isabelle-86 maintains the eigenvariable conditions -it accounts for assignments to variables in F and A, forbidding those that would introduce y into F or A.
The meta-logic ~/¢/ represents each inference rule as an implication. This fails is a premise has free variables. Subject to the usual conditions, the following inference is valid:
The following implication is invalid:
Both cases involve implicit quantification over y, but with different scopes.
Replacing3, by a special term can transform the implication (6) into a valid formula. For this, J{ is too weak a meta-logic, so let us temporarily adopt full higher-order logic.
HILBERT'S e-OPERATOR
Church's formulation of higher-order logic includes the Hilbert e-operator: ex. ¢ is a term for any formula ¢. It embodies a strong Axiom of Choice. If ~, is true for some value ofx then ex. ¢ denotes some such value; otherwise ex. ~b has an arbitrary value of the same type as x. (Recall that no type may denote the empty set.) An axiom scheme for the e-operator is Full higher-order logic has classical negation. Putting ~b for 0, taking the contrapositive, and pushing the A x inwards, gives
4)[(ex.~4))/x] ~ Ax.4)
So the special term to plug into the implication (6) is ex. ~ ~b: a value chosen to falsify ~b, if such exists.
The term ex.~ contains the same free variables as A x. ~b. For example, a theorem representing VI in first-order logic is Each eigenvariable is represented by a giant term: ex.~F(x)] contains the formula F, which may contain other e-terms. I tried this cumbersome representation in early versions of Isabelle, but no method of structure sharing would control the exponential growth.
REPLACING HILBERT'S e BY SPECIAL CONSTANTS
Here is something similar to e-terms but more practical. Extend higher-order logic with the axiom scheme
We simply postulate constants to satisfy the implication (6) . For each q5 there is a unique constant y{qS} not free in q~. This is Henkin's technique for reducing first-order logic to propositional logic ([5] p. 30). Its main application is the Completeness Theorem; here it extends our propositional proof methods to first-order logic. The simplest representation of y{qS} is to regard ~b as part of the name, but this is as cumbersome as e-terms. Enumerating names like y{609} (Lisp's GENSYM) does not work if A x. q~ contains free variables: substitution could create distinct instances of (7) , and even introduce occurrences of y{609} in A x. ~b. We must make certain that one constant is not used for different instances of (7) in a proof.
Taking the free variables of A x. ~b as part of the name, and updating them, provides an automatic renaming mechanism -precisely that of Isabelle-86. Thus y{q~ } should be written y{zl ..... z~}, where zl ..... z n are the free variables of A x. qS. The only way to introduce occurrences ofy{~b} into A x. q5 is to instantiate some free variable zi with y{z~ ..... z,,}. This is prevented by the occurs check in unification.
The e-terms can express functions like 2x. ey. ¢, which maps x to some y such that holds. But y{z~ ..... z,,} is a constantso Zl, . . . , z~ must not be bound in the surrounding term. This restricts the generalization rule (A -introduction) to variables not mentioned by special constants. Instead we can use the instantiation rule,
where the variables x~ ..... x, must not be free in the assumptions. In og the rule follows by generalization and specialization, but here it must be taken as primitive.
In each special constant, x~ is replaced by all free variables of a,.
The VI axiom becomes
Note that there is no A F: since the variable F is mentioned by the constant y{F}, it must be free in the axiom. However, we may replace F by a term, creating a new special constant. Replacing The theorems contain different constants y{g} and y{G, H}: thus y{F} is automatically renamed. Compare these with the e-term examples. Keeping just the free variables ofF, rather than F itself, prevents the exponential growth.
LIFTING VERSUS SPECIAL CONSTANTS
Redoing the examples from Section 6.2 illustrates how special constants work.
A Success~d Proof
The first resolution in the backwards proof ofVx. 3y. x = y involves the gI axiom: 
special constants
The variable a cannot be assigned a term containing x{a} or y{a, b} because a is free in these constants.
The variable b cannot be assigned a term containing y{a, b}. for this constant contains b.
The variable c can be assigned a term containing x{a} or y{a, b}, for c is free in neither constant.
Special constants raise many questions. When is the name of a special constant significant, and what is its scope? Does the axiom scheme (7) entail classical logic or the Axiom of Choice? With lifting, the status of parameters is clear. They can be renamed by e-conversion. The scope of a parameter is its goal. Here is a proof state with two subgoals:
The scope of x is the first goal and that of y is the second.
Lifting is clearly preferable -especially because it works in the simple meta-logic ~. Higher-order unification easily copes with the additional function variables like f and g above.
An Implementation
This research has always been concerned with implementation issues, of which the main one is how to represent a logic. I have criticized LCF for representing inference rules as functions, preferring visible structures [28] . But colleagues have pointed out that such structures are essentially the theorems of a (meta) logic, and the functions that manipulate them are (meta) rules. Thus Isabelle adopts LCF's representation at the meta-level.
Object-rules in Isabelle-86 are expressed in the typed 2-calculus and have the familiar pattern of premises over conclusion. Free variables and special constants give the effect of weak quantification. Written in ~,t~', the general form of an Isabelle-86 rule is something like Below the level of rules. Isabelle operates on terms: substitution, normalization. higher-order unification, parsing and printing. Above, Isabelle is concerned with backwards proof: tactics and tacticals. Above pure Isabelle come the object-logics with their special tactics.
M. J. C. Gordon uses higher-order logic as a specification language for hardware. His HOL theorem prover [13] has supported several large proofs about circuit designs [6] . Since HOL is based on LCF, it may seem to be the obvious starting point for a version of Isabelle based on J[. However HOL and Isabelle support distinct methods of use, giving conflicting design requirements. I obtained the current version of Isabelle by modifying Isabelle-86. Only the level of rules needed substantial change; the lower levels were slightly modified and the higher levels hardly at all.
The natural deduction rules of ~f/are represented by the corresponding sequent calculus. A meta-theorem has the form h u ~-~b, where q5 depends on the assumptions • , and expresses object-rules using A and ~. Lifting and resolution are coded directly; implementing them by execution of primitive rules would be painfully slow.
Isabelle now uses A -lifting instead of special constants. Despite having quantifiers, Isabelle provides a separate class of schematic variables 4 -free variables intended for substitution. Why have two kinds of free variables? Consider trying to prove
~(3z. F(z)) & B] ~ E3z. F(z) & B~
which expresses a derived rule about 9 and &. In the proof, the free variables F and B are fixed while the rightmost existential quantifier produces a schematic variable that must eventually be replaced by a term. The meta-rules ensure that every theorem T [-~ has no schematic variables in W; instantiation only affects schematic variables.
Object-logics include intuitionistic first-order logic, Martin-LSf's Constructive Type Theory (CTT) [23] and a first-order sequent calculus similar to LK [35] . The Isabelle-86 logics were easily adapted to the new Isabelle. The most drastic change in the representation of proofs, A -lifting, was the main source of problems. But many things worked immediately, including the object-logics' specialized proof procedures. The Isabelle-86 logics were sequent calculi, but most now have a simpler formulation using natural deduction. Sequent calculi are mainly suitable for classical logic ( [32] p. 245).
All proofs in this paper are in single steps. But Isabelle provides tacticals (resembling LCF's) for joining simple proof procedures into complex ones. Constructive Type Theory has a rewriting tactic that works by executing a 'logic program' derived from CTT rules. This tactic is heavily used in the largest CTT example, which develops elementary number theory up to the theorem
The first-order sequent calculus has an automatic proof procedure that performs associative unification using higher-order unification ([20] p. 37). The procedure is not complete but it saves many steps in interactive proof and works with any convenient mixture of primitive and derived rules. Using derived rules about set theory, Isabelle can prove theorems like Huet's unification procedure [19] may return, with a unifier, unsolved disagreement pairs <a~, bl > ..... <am, bm>. When this happens, the pairs have at least one and perhaps infinitely many unifiers. To avoid enumerating these unifiers the disagreement pairs can be kept to constrain future unifications. (This is Huet's key observation, which makes his procedure practical.) Isabelle-86 stores with each derived rule q~ its unsolved disagreement pairs. Isabelle now expresses these using equality: Equality also replaces the Isabelle-86 definition mechanism. The meta-axiom K -a defines the constant K. We can then unfold K to a, or fold a back to K. This is more sensible than automatically unfolding all constants.
See the User's Manual for more detailed information about Isabelle [30] . Propositions-as-types seems to offer advantages. Observe that A -lifting and s-lifting would become simply H-lifting. The richer type system allows a neat formalization of typed object-logics: the type term(T) might represent the set of terms of object-type T. The formalization of a typed logic in ogg involves a type of all object-terms, including those of no legal object-type; object-level type checking requires additional rules for type inference. My choice of an old-fashioned calculus for Isabelle reflects practical considerations.
Under propositions-as-types, the formal proof of the proposition A consists of a proof of a : A, where a is a proof object. A proof object is smaller than a standard proof tree (which contains repeated subformulae) yet still can grow large. Following the LCF tradition, Isabelle has never stored the steps of proofs. Milner's representation of logic makes stored proofs unnecessary, a vital space saving. Now, some people regard this as a mistake. Martin-L6f's Type Theory exploits propositions-as-types; its proof objects constitute a functional programming language; the theorem prover Nuprl can execute them [8] . The proof objects of ordinary logics may be useful in proof editors.
Isabelle is intended for verifications involving hundreds of proofs, each involving hundreds of steps. Isabelle must support a degree of automation, and this requires unification. Propositions-as-types could consume excessive space; and what would take the place of Huet's unification procedure for higher-order logic [19] ?
The choice of meta-logic can have subtle consequences stemming from the semantics. In J# every type denotes a non-empty set; under propositions-as-types there must be an empty type. Standard first-order logic assumes a non-empty universe, and so Vx. A implies 2x. A. The meta-logic ~¢/ can represent the standard proof, Figure 10 (a). Avron et al. [3] suggest that deriving this in their formalization of first-order logic requires a constant, say 0. Their proof presumably represents that of Figure 10(b) . A logic for the formalization of mathematics must presuppose the very minimum. Philosophers have debated whether a logic must be predicative -free of 'vicious circles' ([37] p. 36):
The vicious circles in question arise from supposing that a collection of objects may contain members which can only be defined by means of the collection as a whole. Thus, for example, the collection of propositions will be supposed to contain a proposition stating that "'all propositions are either true or false." It would seem, however, that such a statement could not be legitimate unless "'all propositions" referred to some already definite collection, which it cannot do if new propositions are created by statements about "'all propositions." We shall, therefore, have to say that statements about 'all propositions" are meaningless. Most of the other calculi are predicative and intuitionistic. To make oJ¢~" predicative, we can forbid bound variables whose type involves prop. The resulting system is much weaker but can still serve as a meta-logic, which requires only quantification over object-formulae. Its proof theory is as simple as that of first-order logic.
Amy Felty and Dale Miller [12] have formalized several logics in a logic programming language based on HOL. Logically their formalizations resemble those in Sections 3 and 5, but also express search procedures involving tactics and tacticals. Felty and Miller compare these with the usual approach of programming tactics in ML. They claim that the Edinburgh Logical Framework can be easily translated into higher-order logic.
Higher-order logic makes an adequate meta-logic from the theoretical perspective. We can draw on established proof theory to demonstrate soundness and completeness of the formalization of first-order logic: compare with the argument in Harper et al. [15] . The implementation, Isabelle, demonstrates its practical strengths. Basing Isabelle's reasoning methods on a precise calculus has already lead to extensions such as hypothetical rules. It is shedding light on issues such as theory structure.
